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Personalized Class Actions
Omri Ben-Shahar†
Algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) are changing our world in
profound ways. They are introducing previously unthinkable products and
services and affecting our daily lives in many ways. The AI revolution is
taking center stage also in law, but among legal academics, the primary
interest is not how to introduce robotic methods to law, especially where they
can improve upon imperfect, biased, and discriminatory human decisions.
Rather, much of the focus among legal academics is alarmist: how to pull the
brakes on the looming “takeover” by machines—the so-called algorithms of
oppression and weapons of math destruction—and how to reform the law so
as to establish limits and guarantees against misuse of algorithms.1
No doubt important, the cautionary agenda should not suffocate
experimentation with AI methods in law, especially in areas where Big Data
and machine-learning methods can replace highly imperfect rules and biased
human discretion.2 To that end, legal scholars could be at the forefront of a
creative agenda, imagining and designing legal frameworks that would be
fueled by data and advised by algorithms.3 Peter Salib’s article, Artificially
† University of Chicago Law School
1. See generally, CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); MEREDITH BROUSSARD,
ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW COMPUTERS MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD (2018); VIRGINIA
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH
THE POOR (2017); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF
OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018).
2. See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 237, 240–42 (2018).
3. See, e.g., Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein,
Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 114 (2018); Crystal S. Yang
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Intelligent Class Actions,4 is a striking exemplar of that creative agenda. Salib
is offering a novel application of AI methods in law—and not a science
fiction one, but rather a specific tool that would solve one of the biggest
problems in protective law: how to allow people with similar but different
claims to band together in class actions. Specifically, Salib considers how to
use statistical tools within the parameters permitted by law so that the
differences between the class members will not eclipse the similarities.
A fundamental tradeoff in civil litigation is between accuracy and
litigation costs: how to design cost-justified procedures for effective
vindication of uncertain legal rights. Almost every doctrine of civil procedure
represents some balance between the two goals, but none with greater stakes
than those governing class actions.5 When numerous parties have claims that
are sufficiently similar, the cost of pursuing each claim individually can be
saved by aggregating them into a single representative suit while applying a
single one-size-fits-all result to all claims.
The one-size-fits-all outcome of group litigation sacrifices accuracy,
since the joined claims are not identical. But it saves litigation costs in
avoiding relitigating identical questions and prevents an even greater
inaccuracy if otherwise the individual claims would be too costly to pursue.
The more the cases are alike, the greater the benefit of aggregation and the
lesser the accuracy sacrifice. Much of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure conceptualizes what it means for cases to be alike, guaranteeing
that the upside of reduced litigation costs is not overwhelmed by the
downside of inaccuracy.6
Using statistical tools in litigation heightens this accuracy-versus-costsaving dilemma. Statistics help characterize the distribution of cases and treat
each case along some measure of typicality. This can be done relatively
cheaply and efficiently and then scaled up to a large plaintiff group at little
cost. But it ordinarily draws out average characteristics, average injuries, or
other synthetic midrange values, which means that it ignores (averages out)
factors unique to each case, sometimes viewed as “noise.” With statistical
tools, uncertainty over the unique merits of specific claims is not resolved but
rather addressed by referring to that midrange value of the distribution. True,
under the law of large numbers, this exercise guarantees that the expected

& Will Dobbie, Equal Protection Under Algorithms: A New Statistical and Legal Framework, 119
MICH. L. REV. 291, 297 (2021).
4. Peter N. Salib, Artificially Intelligent Class Actions, 100 TEXAS L. REV. 519 (2022).
5. See Hillel J. Bavli, Aggregating for Accuracy: A Closer Look at Sampling and Accuracy in
Class Action Litigation, 14 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 67, 70 (2015).
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see Salib, supra note 4, at 520–21, 521 n.7.
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error for the entire class is small and could even come close to zero.7
Mismeasurement for one member of the class is offset by an oppositedirection mismeasurement for another member. The accuracy thus achieved
is at the level of the group, guaranteeing the defendant pays the right
aggregate amount, equal to the total overall harm caused to all victims. But
accuracy is not achieved at the level of the individual. Some members of the
plaintiffs’ class receive more than their injuries merit; others receive less.
Accordingly, while statistical methods in aggregate litigation satisfy the
“defendant-accuracy” criterion—setting the magnitude of aggregate liability
equal to the magnitude of aggregate harm—they fail the “plaintiff-accuracy”
criterion. This, according to the Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart v. Dukes8 case,
is a fatal flaw.9 The defendant Wal-Mart, the Court held, had a substantive
right to insist on “individualized determinations of each employee’s
eligibility for backpay.”10 Because the harm to individual members of the
class could have varied store by store and because plaintiffs did not establish
in their statistical methods the store-by-store disparity (or other fine-grained
differential effects), the statistical method failed the plaintiff-accuracy test.11
An aside: call me simple-minded, but I find it mystifying why plaintiff
accuracy matters so critically to the Supreme Court (and in a class action
context of all places). The defendant, it seems, is shedding crocodile tears—
with surprising success—in complaining that while it will be charged with
the accurate measure of aggregate liability, the statistical tools will miss out
on plaintiff accuracy. Once an exacting standard of defendant accuracy is
policed by the court, and if plaintiffs freely elect to forgo plaintiff accuracy
when they band together for redress, it is a bit rich to stand up and righteously
agonize that individual plaintiffs might not be accurately compensated.
Particularly since the denial of class certification has the pragmatic effect of
no recovery, which ends up aggravating both sides of the inaccuracy. Surely,
it is better that plaintiffs will get a rough estimate of their harm than the wrong
measure of zero.
Be that as it may, the Wal-Mart precedent requires class aggregation to
satisfy plaintiff accuracy, and unfortunately statistical methods like
regression analysis that look at national trends without sufficient granularity

7. See generally LARRY C. ANDREWS & RONALD L. PHILLIPS, FIELD GUIDE TO PROBABILITY,
RANDOM PROCESSES, AND RANDOM DATA ANALYSIS 14 (2012) (defining the law of large
numbers).
8. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
9. Id. at 366.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 357 (“A regional pay disparity, for example, may be attributable to only a small
set of Wal-Mart stores[] and cannot by itself establish the uniform, store-by-store disparity upon
which the plaintiffs’ theory of commonality depends.”).
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cannot assure the satisfaction of this test.12 While individuals will be
compensated correctly on average, it is quite possible and even likely that a
great many individual awards will be misaligned with those individuals’
actual injury.
Enter Peter Salib with an ingenious solution. Instead of statistical tools
that aim at estimating average impact on a protected group (such as sex or
race), an algorithm will be trained to predict the merits of each individual
claim based on a sample set of substantively litigated cases. The goal is to
award each class member an estimate of individual redress based not on the
average of the overall group but instead on a multitude of factors that
characterize each individual case. If this method could be operationalized, it
would solve the Wal-Mart concern.
What we need, Salib recognizes, is a method to train an algorithm to
predict the differential remedies each class member would have received in
an individual suit. For example, in a wrongful death suit for lost income, each
member of the class would not receive the average value of loss. Instead,
each member would receive a pinpointed estimate of individualized predicted
income based on a host of factors that a trained algorithm would recognize to
correlate with an individual’s future income prospects. In an employment
discrimination suit, each member of the class will receive compensation that
reflects a set of relevant variables that determine actual loss, telling us what
each person with certain skills and attributes would have earned but for the
discrimination.
How would an algorithm generate such individualized estimates? The
key to fulfilling the plaintiff-accuracy criterion is to provide the algorithm
sufficient training data. According to Salib’s plan, the algorithm would be
fed information about how a sample set of prior cases involving class
members, each individually litigated in a pilot phase, were decided. The
algorithm does not need to code the reasons for each decision in the sample
set, but it can merely scan the information in the file of each. The information
about each case would include a list of inputs—facts in the file that describe
the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s circumstances which can be reduced to a
vector of quantitative measures—and outputs measuring the damages
outcome. With a sufficiently large sample set, the algorithm would identify
inputs of a case that are correlated with the magnitude of the individual
compensatory award.
In an employment discrimination case, for example, the algorithm might
detect those factors determining each plaintiff’s size of recovery, which could
include some obvious inputs like age, education, work history, or
12. See id. at 356–57; Salib, supra note 4, at 535–37 (discussing the Wal-Mart Court’s
disapproval of the respondents’ statistical methods and arguing that this disapproval was based on
accuracy concerns).
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productivity and some less obvious ones such as height or family status.13
The method could also detect—and this would be key to the litigation—
correlations between the compensatory award and prohibited factors. These
correlations would no longer have the problems of statistical evidence à la
Wal-Mart. The algorithm might “notice” that not all women plaintiffs were
successful in their discrimination suits, identifying additional factors that
identify the subset among those plaintiffs who prevailed. For example, only
women in certain positions, or in certain geographic locations, or of certain
age groups were successful. And even when these women were discriminated
against, the wage reduction due to discrimination would be measured in a
more accurate and attenuated manner, excluding the wage effect of other
interacting individual factors.
Salib argues that using an algorithm thus trained via a sample set of pilot
lawsuits would resolve the plaintiff-accuracy concern of Wal-Mart and that
this method of estimation can be practically designed.14 I agree on the first
claim and can be further persuaded on the second. The potential accuracy of
predictive algorithms is a premise on which many collective activities dealing
with pools of people already rely—e.g., insurance, credit markets,
employment hiring, and, of course, digital services—and Salib is more than
entitled to assume that it could potentially be harnessed in the litigation pool.
While each class action would no doubt require an ambitious training phase
whereby a sufficiently large sample set of cases would have to go through
individual litigation generating sufficient raw data on which an algorithm
would be trained and tested for accuracy, there are enough big disputes with
massive class sizes to justify such sample sets and to make this tool get off
the ground.15
If Salib is right that his algorithmic prediction method passes the WalMart accuracy test—namely, that courts would accept algorithmic
predictions of individual case merit based on data from prior cases—I want
to think out loud whether the method can be further improved. Is a sample
set that includes dozens (if not more) of individually litigated cases
necessary? Can we do without this cumbersome detour? I want to suggest
13. Cf. id. at 545 (explaining that algorithms designed for loan issuance or candidate screening
might use “resumé, job history, income, credit score,” among other factors, “to mimic interviewinformed human decisions”). Similarly, in medical-causation cases, inputs might include medical
and employment records as well as “questionnaire-based testimony—made under oath—from
plaintiffs.” Id. at 546.
14. Id. at 524, 547–48.
15. See, e.g., Edward Segal, Workplace Class Action Settlements Set New Record In 2021:
Report,
FORBES
(Jan.
4,
2022,
5:00
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsegal/2022/01/04/workplace-class-action-settlements-setnew-record-in-2021-report/?sh=7197d57040b8 [https://perma.cc/GR5C-4SFW] (discussing a
record number of 1,607 class action rulings in 2021 and a record amount of settlements at $3.62
billion).
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that the accuracy achieved via litigation by prediction in the individual level
could be obtained without Salib’s pilot phase. Instead, a class action could
rely on statistical analysis based on the very same factors that are
substantively relevant in the individual cases and that become the inputs of
Salib’s algorithm. Every class action could accordingly be resolved by
aggregating the procedure but disaggregating the remedies members of the
class are entitled to, each according to their idiosyncratic traits as identified
by the already trained algorithm. Indeed, the approach can be applied to all
litigation—not only class actions. If we trust the accuracy of algorithms or
regression methods in estimating and predicting individual merits, why not
put this to use in single-plaintiff cases?
But let us focus on class actions and think whether they can reach
plaintiff accuracy without Salib’s pilot phase of individual lawsuits.
Remember, the goal is to move away from averages—from giving all
members of the class a uniform, midvalue redress. Some deserve more;
others deserve less. In Salib’s sample set, separate courts will figure out who
deserves what, and their findings will be used to train an algorithm to figure
out who gets how much when they individually litigate and then replicate this
formula for other class members. But on what basis will the separate courts
in the sample set decide each individual case? In Title VII litigation involving
employment sex discrimination, particularly when the claim is for
discrimination in pay, statistical proof is allowed to show disparate impact so
long as the impact is correlated with the employer’s policy.16 In principle,
each case would have to establish a case-specific benchmark—the wage paid
by this employer to other (male) workers with attributes similar to the
plaintiff’s (e.g., education, experience, performance scores). The court would
then compare such a case-specific benchmark with the wage actually paid to
the individual female claimant in the case and award redress equal to the
measured gap. The case-specific wage benchmark would of course be
different across plaintiffs in the sample set—this variation was the premise
of the Wal-Mart Court in rejecting class certification and requiring individual
litigation.17 The case-specific wage benchmark would accurately reflect
variation in pay metrics across the different geographic regions and locations
in which the defendant/employer operates, across the different departments
of operation, across different periods of time, or across other circumstances
relevant to the outcome in the labor market. In the individual lawsuits, taking
such variations into account in setting the case-specific benchmark
guarantees that the resulting damages would be plaintiff accurate.
Does this methodology have to be performed anew in every case? Do
courts have to distill the plaintiff-specific benchmark case by case? I suspect
16. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 356–59 (2011).
17. Id. at 357.

168

Texas Law Review Online

[Vol. 100:162

that Salib would agree that it does not. In the sample set, the first few courts
would develop a general substantive method to ascertain the wage benchmark
for the plaintiff in front of them, but soon courts that follow will borrow the
method from earlier cases and apply it to subsequent individual plaintiffs.
They will do so because the method is general even if its application is case
specific. The method tells us which factors determine the pay an employee is
entitled to.
Taking this logic to the limit, a sample set would not be needed at all.
The substantive inquiry early courts in this set are expected to make for
subsequent courts to follow could be pursued in a class action from the getgo without a sample set. For each plaintiff in a class of all women employees,
a personalized plaintiff-specific wage benchmark would be computed—not
a single uniform benchmark for all, but a formula that calculates how the
benchmark depends on workers’ characteristics. From this formula a
personalized wage figure would be derived for each member of the class.
This personalized benchmark figure would be identical to the case-specific
benchmark tailored to each claimant based on case-by-case sample set
litigation because it would be computed from the same data answering the
same question: what wage is typically paid by the employer to other male
workers with attributes like those of the plaintiff?
Notice that while this method focuses on the difference in pay between
men and women, it does not average it out. Instead, for each woman in the
class, a different pay gap would be estimated. For some, there will be no gap
vis-à-vis equally qualified men; for others, the gap might be substantial. The
distribution of gaps across women in the class will be the same distribution
that would come out from separate individual actions.
Accordingly, when the merits of each case are determined by statistical
evidence, as often happens in wage-discrimination suits, there really is no
need for a sample set of individually litigated cases, and therefore there is
also no need to train an algorithm to predict case outcomes based on such a
sample. The Wal-Mart Court’s plaintiff-accuracy concern can be resolved by
a shortcut: a statistical method that is careful not to average the award class
members receive. In the manner described, each member of the class is
awarded redress in relation to her personalized, algorithm-derived, targetwage benchmark figure.
Specifically, the plaintiffs in the Wal-Mart case failed because they were
equipped with a statistical method that was too crude. They controlled for
some factors that explain wage variation, but not all. Had they controlled for
a more comprehensive list of regressors (e.g., different Wal-Mart stores)—
or, ideally, for all correlated inputs—the objection by the Court would have
likely subsided. When you run the regression model in such a manner,
plaintiff accuracy increases.
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This example of a wage-discrimination suit and how it can dispense with
the need for a sample set of individual cases may be misleading because it is
a special case. Its logic is specific to claims that already are natural candidates
for statistical evidence at the individual dispute level. Discrimination lawsuits
are often such cases—a persuasive way to show that a complainant was
discriminated against is by statistically comparing that complainant to others.
Because the evidence in any individual case involves data on comparables,
my intervention here is to suggest that such data could also be used in the
class proceedings, and if analyzed with sufficient depth, it could yield the
same results that Salib sought to generate by a sample set of individual
litigation and a subsequent algorithmic mining of it.
But what about the multitude of other cases in which the merits are
adjudicated on the basis of nonstatistical types of evidence? Consider Salib’s
example of a mass tort class action where plaintiffs who used a product allege
that it caused cancer.18 These are usually unsuitable for class certification
because individual questions dominate.19 Here, too, Salib proposes a pilot
phase in which a sample set of cases would be individually litigated, and
subsequently an algorithm would analyze the results, identify case features
that correlate with plaintiff success, and replicate the results for the entire
class, differentiating the outcome plaintiff by plaintiff.20 Can we implement
the differentiation without this process and without the sample set phase? If
the merits of individual claims depend on factors that vary across class
members (like duration and intensity of exposure to the carcinogenic product,
the type of warning they received, or the presence of other intervening causes
of cancer), and if the measure of damages each successful plaintiff receives
varies by the gravity of injury (and it too depends on idiosyncratic inputs), an
aggregated lawsuit could in principle account for all of these factors. The
outcome of the class litigation would not treat all members of the class as an
average case and would not reach a uniform result across all plaintiffs.
Instead, it would have to generate a formula to specify which inputs of those
characterizing individual plaintiffs affect defendant’s liability and how to
weigh those factors. The formula will then be applied to each class member
individually, granting each a personalized remedy.
No doubt, asking a court to follow such a formula is a high order, and
the difficulty in constructing one probably explains the reluctance to certify

18. See Salib, supra note 4, at 521, 521 n.4, 544; cf., e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997).
19. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.7 (2004) (“Mass tort personal injury
cases are rarely appropriate for class certification for trial.”); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522
F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 43 (2d Cir.
2006)).
20. Salib, supra note 4, at 544–47.
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such personal injury classes.21 A court would have to account for factors that
are observed and weighed by judges and juries in individual proceedings
based on specific evidence without seeing that evidence. If these factors are
to be relied upon in a class action decision, the court will have to develop an
explicit formula, and courts are not accustomed to doing this. They will have
to allow the plaintiffs to develop and introduce algorithms that analyze prior
case law and derive the formula that reflects precedent. Indeed, existing
algorithms developed to predict court outcomes and offer legal advice (which
Salib invokes to motivate his own AI method) do just that: they identify the
factors that are correlated with prior case outcomes.22 Even with such a
formula, applying it to individual plaintiffs would be challenging, as the
features that characterize each are not as handy as in Title VII suits. But if
these features can be distilled from a sample set of prior suits, they could
perhaps be predicted based on prior case law.
Consider another example—a class action in which consumers seek
damages for a wrongful act, either tort or breach of contract, but vary widely
in their consequential harms. A class action procedure that awards each
member of the class a uniform sum of money would violate plaintiff
accuracy. Salib’s solution would involve a sample set of individual cases,
each seeking proof of the individual plaintiff’s harm and awarding plaintiffaccurate damages. Here too, the distribution of damage remedies could be
created in a class proceeding so long as the factors that determine individuals’
entitlement to remedies are systematic. For example, harm may be correlated
with age, income, education, occupation, or specific physical attributes.
These factors will have to be proven in the class action and then applied to
all members.
In sum, the key to Salib’s approach is the idea that the merits of
individual cases and the magnitude of damages each plaintiff is likely to
receive depend on factors that can be teased out systematically from prior
court decisions. If so, they could also be teased out in a class proceeding.
Instead of asking different courts or juries in the sample set time and again to
redo this exercise of weighing the relevant inputs and identifying those that
matter for liability, the effort can be concentrated with more statistical effort
in the class action.

21. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 609–10.
22. See, e.g., Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1305, 1331–32 (2019); Rebecca Crootof, “Cyborg Justice” and the Risk of Technological-Legal
Lock-In, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 233, 233–34 (2019); Bernard Marr, How AI and Machine Learning
are Transforming Law Firms and the Legal Sector, FORBES (May 23, 2018, 12:29 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/23/how-ai-and-machine-learning-aretransforming-law-firms-and-the-legal-sector/?sh=4a5e7232c388 [https://perma.cc/6VRG-TUR7];
ANTHONY J. CASEY & ANTHONY NIBLETT, MIT COMPUTATIONAL L. REP., WILL ROBOT JUDGES
CHANGE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT OUTCOMES? 2 (2020).
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Salib recognizes a version of this critique. In his discussion of
settlements, he notes the following:
Freed from the need to emulate a particular jury’s decision function,
the parties would have no need for sample adjudications. Instead, they
could directly deploy commercially produced, off-the-shelf
algorithms designed to answer the individual questions at hand. Such
algorithms would provide quick and cheap answers to the question,
“What would an average jury say about the validity and value of each
class member’s claim?” Those answers could be transposed directly
into settlement agreements, since settling parties have little reason to
believe that their jury would be different from the average one.23
True, in settlement negotiations plaintiff accuracy can be waived. Using
predictive tools from prior case law may be instructive, but it does not give a
sufficiently accurate assessment of the varying strengths of the class
members’ claims. If this estimation is compounded with evidence specific to
the pending liability issues, greater accuracy would be achieved. This is why
predictions based on prior case law may not be useful to overcome WalMart’s accuracy problem. A new algorithm involving the practices of each
defendant is needed for each case to determine the weights of the various
inputs. In developing this litigation-specific algorithm, we could hopefully
do without a sample set of individual cases.
In the end, Salib opens our eyes to a novel way to overcome Wal-Mart’s
objection to statistics. If Wal-Mart’s command is to stay away from the
averaging of claims—namely, to reach a sufficient level of plaintiff
accuracy—we need statistical methods that are trained to predict individual
merits. The specific algorithm Salib has in mind, trained by a sample set of
individual lawsuits, may not be the only (or even the most elegant) statistical
tool for this estimation. But this is a technicality, and it can be refined over
time. The breakthrough in Salib’s article is the qualitative insight: a new
understanding of the potential use of statistics in class actions.

23. Salib, supra note 4, at 554–55 (footnote omitted).

